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A PROPOSAL FOR UNIFORM REGULATION OF
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AMERICAN REAL
ESTATE

In almost any society with a formal economy, ownership of real
property is a valuable sign of wealth. Real property in the United
States is particularly important because it attracts investment money
from beyond domestic boundaries. In the U.S., real property is not
merely an indicia of or a means to acquire wealth, but also a secure
and stable way to maintain wealth. Foreign investors often rely on
U.S. real estate investments to avoid precarious political or financial
climates and view the U.S. economy more favorably than that of other
countries.
This influx of foreign money can rejuvenate U.S. real estate markets. Foreign land investment also benefits the national economy as a
whole, increasing tax revenues, providing jobs, and offsetting large
exports. Nevertheless, foreign investment raises fears of foreign takeovers and can stimulate federal and state attempts to regulate foreign
investment. Foreign land investment presents a particularly complex
issue due to the inherent conflict between the perceived dangers and
desired economic benefits of foreign land ownership. For these reasons, developing a regulatory system that will reconcile the conflict
may lie beyond traditional means of land investment regulation.
This Note evaluates the current system of regulating foreign
investment in U.S. real estate and concludes that innovation is necessary to address the dangers and benefits of foreign land investment.
Section I analyzes the current status of foreign land investment. Section II surveys current foreign land investment regulation on federal
and state levels. Section III analyzes the question of whether the current statutory framework furthers the interests of the United States
and its citizens and concludes that the lack of uniformity among foreign land investment statutes causes confusion, obstructs beneficial
investment, and prevents the states from furthering their interests.
Section IV poses a solution to these problems in the form of a foreign
land investment law that would be flexible to accommodate local
needs yet provide national uniformity through its adoption by the
states. The achievement of national uniformity and local flexibility
would help attract foreign investment to areas where it will have a
beneficial effect and would discourage foreign investment from areas
where it will be harmful. Section V outlines a model for such a uni-
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form law that would address the problems of foreign land investment
and remedy the failings of current regulation.
I.

THE PRESENT STATUS OF FOREIGN LAND
INVESTMENT

A.

THE AMOUNT AND EXTENT OF LAND HOLDINGS

Foreign investment in U.S. real property is often both economically desirable and problematic. Investment draws needed capital into
this country, thereby expanding tax bases and offsetting trade deficits.
Yet, many Americans are concerned that foreign ownership of U.S.
real estate surrenders control of an extremely vital and basic resource
into the hands of foreigners. Foreign ownership may also disrupt
domestic land markets by increasing land prices to levels at which
many U.S. investors cannot afford to purchase land.'
Recent investment activity in U.S. real estate 2 has thrived despite
these fears and the non-uniformity of state and federal attempts to
minimize incentives. At the end of 1974, foreign investors owned 4.9
million acres of U.S. real property, and foreign-owned U.S. enterprises
3
leased 63 million acres.
Recent figures indicate that the amount of foreign investment in
U.S. real estate is increasing. Despite a decline in total foreign invest1. See The Foreign Land Grab Scare, TIME, Jan. 8, 1979, at 40.
2. The term "real estate investment" has several meanings. Technically, it means the
purchase and sale of real property solely for the property's investment value. The U.S.
Department of Commerce and other informational sources describe a real estate investment
as a sub-category of "foreign direct investment." Other types of investment may also
involve real property and thereby affect land ownership patterns. Because this Note evaluates the effects of foreign investment activity upon land use patterns and local communities,
a broader definition of land investment is appropriate. Therefore, this Note defines "real
estate investment" as any investment activity that involves, even tangentially, the purchase
and sale of real estate. For example, although the location of a Volkswagen automobile
plant in Pennsylvania is technically an industrial or manufacturing investment by a West
German corporation, this Note considers this activity to be a real estate investment. See
infra notes 102, 107 and accompanying text.
A "benchmark survey" of foreign investment by the Department of Commerce in 1974,
pursuant to the Foreign Investment Study Act, Pub. L. No. 93-479, 88 Stat. 1450 (1974),
discovered 829 affiliates classified in real estate investment or in combined offices of real
estate, insurance, finance, and law. This survey did not, however, include several activities
that have a significant effect on real estate, such as hotel and resort operation within the
real estate. See 1 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT TO CONGRESS 55 (1976) [hereinafter cited as FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT]; 2 U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES, BENCHMARK SURVEY (1976) [hereinafter cited as BENCHMARK SUR-

VEY]. The recent history of investment in Hawaii demonstrates the relation between hotel
and resort operation and real estate investment. Between 1972 and 1975, foreign real estate
investment in Hawaii increased from less than $100 million to $585 million. Most of this
increase can be attributed to investment in resort hotels, condominiums, subdivisions, and
tract housing. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra, at 185.
3. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 2, at 104.
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ment in 1981-82, the percentage of foreign investment in U.S. real
estate grew. In 1981, foreign investors spent sixteen cents of every
dollar on real estate. In 1982 this figure increased to twenty-seven
cents of every dollar.4 Nonetheless, a precise determination of current
foreign holdings in U.S. land is quite difficult. Difficulties in calculation arise primarily because the most accurate records of land ownership are found at state and local levels, and few states require foreign
investors to disclose their landholdings.5 Moreover, many foreign
investors own and operate their U.S. real estate holdings through
domestic holding companies or subsidiaries.
According to U.S. government figures, foreign investment in U.S.
real estate in 1979 totalled $4.2 billion. 6 The actual extent of foreign
investment, however, is significantly greater than these figures indicate
because of foreign investors' use of U.S. corporations and tax havens.
For example, investors from the Middle East reportedly have invested
over a billion dollars in U.S. property, a figure that far exceeds the
7
official amount.
Investment in real estate by foreign interests occurs throughout
the U.S. with capital from all areas of the world. In fact, common
perceptions of Arab sheiks with large bankrolls dangerously understate the foreign land investment issue. The most active nations in the
U.S. real estate investment scheme are the United Kingdom and Canada.8 Other important investing nations include the Netherlands,
France, and the Latin American countries. 9 The Middle East and
Asia also actively invest in the U.S. real estate market. 10
A stable political climate, a constant population, economic
growth, markets that are understandable to most European investors,
and the universality of the English language attract foreign investors
to the United States." Real property in the U.S. provides a more
4. Turpin, U.S. Land is the Best Bet, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 16, 1983, pt. VII (Real Estate),
at 1, 12 (statement of Paul Nussbaum, senior partner of Schulte, Roth & Zabel, a New
York law firm that represents many major European investors).
5. FOREIGN DIRECT INvESTMENT, supra note 2, at 183.
6. See InternationalInvestment in U.S. Real Estate: Who, Where, and How, 41 URB.
LAND, May 1982, at 3, 5 (recounting U.S. Dep't of Commerce statistics) [hereinafter cited
as InternationalInvestment]. The $4.2 billion breaks down as follows: office building
investment property, 38% of the total, or $1.6 billion; commercial/retail property, 33.7%,
or $1.43 billion; unimproved land, held presumably for speculation, 13.5%, or $565 million; residential land, 8.3%, or $350 million; and industrial land, 4.6%, or $194 million.
Other investments constituted the remaining $66 million. Id. at 5.
7. Id. at 4.
8. FOREIGN DIRECT INvESTMENT, supra note 2, at 184.
9. InternationalInvestment, supra note 6, at 3.
10. Id.
11. Roulac, Advising Foreign Investors in US. Real Estate, 9 REAL EST. L.J. 108, 11012 (1980); see InternationalInvestment, supra note 6, at 3-14 (report of discussion by panel
on foreign investment which included members of foreign investment interests).
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promising risk-return factor than other forms of investment, and the
ownership of property is a way to establish a presence in a U.S. com-

munity. 12 American markets also enjoy attractive labor conditions,
affordable raw materials, and specialized technologies.13 Furthermore, environmental regulations, which constrain real estate develop-

ment in Europe, have not yet had as dramatic an effect in the United
States. 14 These factors create a push-pull effect, drawing investment

capital into U.S. real estate markets and simultaneously pushing it out
of foreign countries experiencing economic decline.15
Investment activity in U.S. real estate takes many forms in both

urban and rural/agricultural contexts.16 Some foreign investors deal
exclusively in unimproved land, primarily for speculative purposes;

others invest in many different types of holdings, largely in urban
areas. Urban investment projects vary, ranging from residential uses,
which include subdivisions, condominium projects and garden apart-

ments, to commercial uses, which encompass office building management and shopping centers. 7 Foreign investors have also recently
become involved in planned unit developments.' 8

Investment in U.S. agricultural land has also become more popular as the world food supply grows scarce. 19 Many nations, notably
12. Roulac, supra note 11, at 110.
13. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 2, at xiii.
14. InternationalInvestment, supra note 6, at 13 (statement of Pierre Hueber, Chief
Operating Officer of Wilma Int'l, Antwerp, Belguim). These processes include pollution
and noise limits, traffic regulations, restrictive land use policies, environmental design regulations, and rent controls. Id. at 13.
15. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, supra note 2, at xiii.
16. This distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural land is not a perfect one.
In fact, the fear of foreign investment in U.S. agricultural land arises to some extent out of
a concern that urban investment practices will be applied to agricultural areas. Members of
agricultural communities fear that foreign investors will transfer urban land issues and
development to rural areas, destroying local economies and changing communities. See
infra note 46 and accompanying text.
17. B. ZAGARIS, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 285-300 (1980); see
also InternationalInvestment, supra note 6, at 4-7.
The most popular urban real estate investment markets in the United States are New
York City; Houston; Dallas; Chicago; San Francisco; Denver; Los Angeles; the Miami/
Tampa/Palm Beach area; Washington, D.C.; and Atlanta. InternationalInvestment, supra
note 6, at 5. The most popular agricultural investment markets are found in Tennessee,
Georgia, and South Carolina. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, ECONOMICS, STATISTICS,
AND COOPERATIVES SERVICE, AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC REPORT No. 447, FOREIGN
OWNERSHIP OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL LAND 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as AGRICULTURAL
ECONOMIC REPORT].

18. A planned unit development (PUD) is a combination of different types of residential and commercial projects located in a single preplanned area. These developments often
have common areas of planned open space, cluster housing, community shopping centers,
and recreation facilities. PUDs have been a popular form of investment for foreigners from
Iran and the Netherlands, and have been especially popular in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. See B. ZAGARIS, supra note 17, at 293.
19. Id. at 128.

1985]

FOREIGN REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT

West Germany, Japan, the Middle East, and Latin America, invest in
agricultural real estate in the United States. 20 Agricultural investment
is unlike urban investment in one particular respect-individuals generally undertake agricultural land investment on a much smaller scale
than urban investment. Many foreigners who invest in U.S. farmland
are wealthy European and Asian individuals seeking speculative
gain. 2 1 Foreign investors in urban land are often professional land
bankers, while agricultural investors hold U.S. farmland primarily as a
source of secondary income. Foreign corporations, nonetheless, hold
more than ten times the acreage that foreign individuals hold.2 2 Individual investors, however, are much greater in number and are not
heavily involved in urban investment.
Foreign investments in U.S. real estate may be structured in various ways. Most obviously, a foreign individual or corporation may
buy a specific quantity of land and administer the investment from
overseas. 23 An investor may also acquire real estate through a local
subsidiary of a foreign corporation. In this way, foreign persons may
still make investment decisions from abroad, but the actual investor is
a domestic entity. Finally, foreigners may enter into partnerships or
limited partnerships with domestic investors in order to acquire U.S.
real property.

B.

THE EFFECT OF FOREIGN LAND HOLDINGS

The real effect of foreign ownership of U.S. land is difficult to
ascertain. Nonetheless, foreign acquisition and holding of U.S. land
prompt xenophobic feelings in many Americans. 24 Whether rationally
justified or not, these xenophobic emotions are often manifested as
fears of foreign takeovers, undue influence, and increased competition.
The following are some of the most commonly cited reasons to fear
foreign land investment:
1) Foreign land investment poses a threat to national security
and sovereignty;
20. Id. at 128-30.
21. Id. See also AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC REPORT, supra note 17, at 5.

22. Id
23. Nonresident alien investment activity creates popular fear and exposes the investor
to the strictest forms of governmental regulation. See infra notes 57 & 103 and accompanying text.
24. Xenophobia is an unreasonable fear of foreigners. In this context, the term refers
to the fear, misunderstanding, or mistreatment of foreigners as the basis for restricting
foreign real estate investment. Legislation to curtail foreign land investment is xenophobic
if it is not rationally related to a legitimate foreign threat. The term xenophobia was first
applied to attitudes concerning foreign ownership of U.S. real property in a 1980 note.
Note, Our Land is Your Land: State Restriction ofAlien Land Ownership and the Needfor
FederalLegislation, 13 J. MAR. L. REv. 679, 679 (1980).
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2) Foreigners are primarily interested in long-term capital appreciation instead of production or profit;
3) Foreign real estate investment will change the structure of
local communities by neglecting indigenous institutions and
businesses and by superimposing different labor patterns;
4) Foreign investment will increase prices through bidding wars
in which the foreign investor has the advantage of large
amounts of ready cash and will increase the complexity of
ownership by adding more participants to the ownership process (see #5 below); and
5) Foreign land ownership will install absentee ownership, which
dilutes the sense of local community and thereby decreases
civic involvement and responsibility to the community. 25
Most of these concerns do not arise out of pure xenophobia; they
have some economic foundation. For example, the concern that foreign investors will price their domestic counterparts out of the U.S.
market stems from foreign investors' willingness to pay higher prices
for U.S. real estate. This willingness results from the attractiveness of
U.S. land as compared to other foreign investment sources. 26 Furthermore, foreign real estate investors tend to focus their holdings in particular geographic areas, reducing real estate availability in these
regions.2 7 Ninety percent of all foreign land acquisitions are concentrated in twenty states. 28 Foreign ownership of the food supply may
25. These arguments are synthesized in Atkinson & Jones, Should ForeignersOwn Our
Land?, reprintedin SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY, 95TH

57,
58-59 (Comm. Print 1979).
There is a fine line between xenophobic reactions and the objective, rational realities of
foreign land investment. Nonetheless, the express policies of foreign investors support
many of these factors. See, e.g., InternationalInvestment, supra note 6, at 7-14 (statements
of six foreign investors active in U.S. real estate). Most foreign corporations prefer to
invest in real property by means of all-cash deals, as opposed to mortgaging or joint venCONG., 2D SEss., FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL LAND

tures, and they prefer investments that promise strong capital growth. Id. These general-

izations, however, are not without exception. Iqbal Mamdani challenges a common myth
about Arab land investors: "[A]l1 cash transactions are not attractive to our clients,
although many prospective sellers assume that foreign investors, particularly from the Middle East, prefer this sort of transaction." Id. at 8 (emphasis supplied). See generally
Meacher, ForeignersEye Condos. . . A Summer Test, BARRON'S, June 16, 1980, at 12
(discussion by typical foreign investors in U.S. real estate).
26. In 1978, the price of prime European farmland, for example, was more than twice
as high as that of U.S. farmland. H.R. REP. No. 1570, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS. 2914, 2925.
27. Note, Monitoring Foreign Investment in United States Real Estate, 2 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 29, 32 (1983).
28. Id. at 32 (citing SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY,
95TH CONG. 2D SEss., FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL LAND

45 (Comm. Print 1979)). See Note, Closing the Barn Door: A Suggested United States
Response to InternationalRestrictions of Foreign Acquisition ofAgriculturalLand, 10 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 536, 540 (1980).

1985]

FOREIGN REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT

pose a real threat to national security. Also, foreign investors' general
lack of interest in production or profit can inhibit economic growth.
Holding land for long-term capital appreciation does not stimulate the
economy because it does not provide jobs, products, or services.
On the other hand, foreign real estate investment can rejuvenate
depressed economies, both locally and regionally. The precarious
dichotomy between the benefits and harms of foreign land investment
requires that investment activity be closely monitored and carefully
regulated when necessary.
II.

CURRENT STATUTORY ATTEMPTS TO REGULATE
FOREIGN LAND INVESTMENT

The statutory treatment of foreign real estate investment at both
the federal and state levels has failed to accommodate the dichotomy
between the benefits and harms of foreign investment. The present
status of state and federal regulation of alien land investment creates
disincentives to investment in areas where foreign land ownership
would be beneficial. To a lesser extent, state and federal laws often do
not regulate or restrict foreign investment sufficiently when there is
real danger of foreign control over U.S. land.
A.

FEDERAL STATUTES

Traditionally, federal regulation of foreign real estate investment
has been very limited. The few federal statutes have been directed at
29
specific types of land holdings that are clearly under federal control.
For example, federal laws regulate foreign ownership of geothermal
steam resources 30 and homestead 31 and grazing land, 32 because the
lands themselves are subject to federal control. Recently, however,
Congress has enacted two significant statutes that may limit foreign
real estate investment activity, the Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act of 1980 (FIRPTA) 33 and the Agricultural Foreign
34
Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 (AFIDA).
FIRPTA eliminates a long-standing tax advantage for foreign
investors in U.S. real estate. Before its enactment, gains from the dis29. See infra note 83.

30. 30 U.S.C. § 1015 (1982).
31. 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1976); 43 C.F.R. § 2511.1 (1983).
32. 43 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1976); 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1 (1983).
33. 26 U.S.C. §§ 861, 871, 882, 897, 6039C, 6652 (1982 & West Supp. 1983).
34. 7 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3508 (1982). See also International Investment Survey Act of
1976, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3108 (1982) (authorizing President to conduct program for collecting information on foreign investment; President in turn delegated authority to collect
data on agricultural, rural and urban land investment to the Department of Agriculture);
Exec. Order No. 11858, reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982) (creating the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States to monitor foreign investment activity).
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position of real property by a nonresident alien or foreign corporation
had to be "effectively connected" to a U.S. trade or business to be

subject to U.S. taxation. 35 Under this requirement, many real estate
36
investment transactions conducted from abroad escaped taxation.

Foreign investors could furthermore avoid U.S. taxation in three additional ways. First, they could exchange U.S. real property for like-

kind foreign property that was not subject to U.S. taxation. 37 Second,
they could enter into an installment sale contract after the year of the
sale of real property. 38 Finally, the sale of corporate shares and the
39
liquidation of entities holding U.S. real estate also escaped taxation.
FIRPTA places all income from the disposition of a U.S. real
property interest (USRPI) 4° under the taxing power of the federal gov-

ernment. Specifically, the Act declares that gain or loss by a nonresident alien or foreign corporation from the disposition of a USRPI is
treated (1) as if the taxpayer were engaged in a trade or business
within the United States and (2) as if the gain or loss were effectively
35. 26 U.S.C. §§ 871(a)(2), 882(a)(1), 864(c) (1982). See generally Note, Foreign
Investment in United States Real Estate: Congress Acts to Reduce Incentives, 7 INT'L
TRADE L.J. 150 (1981-82).
36. See Note, Foreign Investment in United States Real Estate, supra note 35, at 15152.
37. I.R.C. § 1031 (1982). See Note, Foreign Investment in United States Real Estate,
supra note 35, at 151.
38. I.R.C. § 453 (1982). See Note, Foreign Investment in United States Real Estate,
supra note 35, at 152.
39. I.R.C. §§ 337, 332, 334(b)(2) (1982). See Note, ForeignInvestment in United States
Real Estate, supra note 35, at 152.
40. FIRPTA, 26 U.S.C. § 897(c)(1)(A), defines a United States Real Property Interest
as:
(i) an interest in real property (including an interest in a mine, well, or other natural deposit) located in the United States or the Virgin Islands, and
(ii) any interest (other than an interest solely as a creditor) in any domestic corporation unless the taxpayer establishes (at such time and in such manner as the
Secretary by regulations prescribes) that such corporation was at no time a
United States real property holding corporation during the shorter of (1) the period after June 18, 1980, during which the taxpayer held such
interest, or
(II) the 5-year period ending on the date of the disposition of such
interest.
The Code further articulates an exclusion:
An interest in United States real property does not include an interest in a corporation, if
(i) as of the date of the disposition of such interest, such corporation did not hold
any United States real property interests, and
(ii) all of the United States real property interests held by such corporations at any
time during the shorter of the periods described in subparagraph (A)(ii)(1) were disposed of in transactions in which the full amount of the gain (if any)
was recognized, or
(II) ceased to be United States real property interests by reason of the application of this subparagraph to 1 or more corporations.
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connected with that trade or business. 4 1 FIRPTA thus constitutes a
declarative statement that investment in U.S. land is a "source" of
income within the United States, and profit from land investment
meets the "effectively connected" test.
FIRPTA has succeeded in equalizing the tax treatment of foreign
and domestic investors in U.S. real estate. FIRPTA is not, however,
intended specifically to discourage or restrict foreign investment.4 2 It
is neither a federal pronouncement on the merits of foreign land
investment, nor a purported solution to all of the problems of foreign

real estate investment.
The second recent federal enactment, AFIDA, requires foreign

persons who acquire or transfer any interest 43 in U.S. agricultural

land44 to submit a report to the Secretary of Agriculture. 45 This
requirement applies to the future acquisitions of U.S. agricultural land

as well as to current holdings by foreign individuals and corporations.
The legislative history of AFIDA articulates a need for further infor-

mation and data collection regarding the extent and effects of foreign
ownership of U.S. farmland. 46 Despite the most vocal fears of foreign
takeovers, Congress did not find the negative effects of foreign agricul-

tural land investment sufficient to justify any action stronger than a
26 U.S.C. § 897(c)(1)(B).
41. 26 U.S.C. § 897(a)(1). FIRPTA, in § 897 places foreign investment gains and
losses within the characterizationrule for U.S. taxation purposes. That is, FIRPTA characterizes foreign investment in U.S. land as a U.S. trade or business subject to federal income
taxation. The Act also amends the source rule of section 861 so that gain from the dispositions of a USRPI is now treated as income from a source within the United States. 26
U.S.C. § 861(a). See Klein, An Analysis of the ForeignInvestment in Real Property Tax Act
of 1980: How it Works, 54 J. TAX'N, 202, 206 (April 1981); Newton, Foreign Investment in
United States Real Property, 34 TAx Exnc. 12 (1981).
42. See generally Metzger, ForeignInvestors Real PropertyTax Act: HistoricalPerspective and CriticalEvaluation, 5 W. NE* ENG. L. REv. 161 (1982).
43. AFIDA, at 7 U.S.C. § 3501(a), qualifies itself by exempting a security interest in
agricultural land from the provisions of the Act.
44. "Agricultural land," is defined by AFIDA as "any land located in one or more
states and used for agricultural, forestry or timber production purposes as determined by
the Secretary [of Agriculture] under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary;" 7
U.S.C. § 3508 (1982).
45. The report must include the legal name and address of the person holding the
interest, the country of his or her citizenship, the nature of the legal entity (if not a person
or a government), the country in which the entity is organized, and the entity's principal
place of business. The report must also include the type of interest held, the legal description of and consideration for the land, the purposes or intended purposes for its use, information about the transferee if it is the foreign party, and any other information the
Secretary of Agriculture may require. 7 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1982).
46. [Ihe lack of any solid, reliable data on foreign investment in U.S. agricultural
land makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine if such investment does, in
fact, pose a threat to the United States as a whole, or to the family farms and rural
communities in this country. Clearly, such information is needed before a reasonable, responsible analysis of the situation can be made.
H.R. REP. No. 1570, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2914, 2920.
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disclosure requirement. 47 Thus, AFIDA is not very restrictive

legislation.
Foreigners are not prohibited from acquiring or disposing of U.S.
farmland under AFIDA. AFIDA's enactment, however, does indicate a congressional awareness of the growing concern with foreign

investment in U.S. land, and it may indicate a tendency toward more
active federal regulation. This Note nonetheless contends that federal
attempts to regulate foreign investment in U.S. real estate have been
and will remain of limited importance. The regulatory scheme concerning foreign land investment largely arises from state legislatures.
Two factors historically have deterred Congress from undertaking comprehensive regulation of foreign real estate investment. The

first is the notion that regulation of foreign real estate investment falls
within the exclusive province of state government, 48 because property
law and the regulation of land ownership traditionally have been matters of state law. 49 Second, the federal interest in promoting the movement of international capital conflicts with a policy of restricting
foreign real estate investment. 50 The federal government is interested
47. See, eg., H.R. REP. No. 1570, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2914, 2917:
If farm income leaves the country and local businesses are bypassed in the
purchase of agricultural inputs for the absentee-owned farming operations, the
adverse effect on the economic and social vitality of rural communities is obvious.
It is suggested that foreign investors may have little incentive to participate in land
conservation programs so essential to the long-term productivity of the soil.
Another danger cited is that concentrated foreign investment could, in a short
time, permit foreign interests to have a controlling voice in the production and
marketing of specialized crops with limited and geographically restricted production. . . . If foreign investment effects such changes in the structure of U.S. agriculture on a broad enough scale, it is argued, this may be reflected in higher food
costs to consumers.
48. See Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 484 (1879) (suit to recover inheritance
brought by foreign next-of-kin to American intestate - law of alien property ownership is
local law of Virginia, state in which property is situated).
The law of nations recognizes the liberty of every government to give to foreigners
only such rights, touching immovable property within its territory, as it may see fit
to concede. Vattel, book 2, c. 8, sect. 114. In our country, this authority is primarily in the States, where the property is situated.
100 U.S. at 484.
See also Morrison, Limitations on Alien Investment in American Real Estate, 60 MINN.
L. REv. 621, 629 (1976).
49. Id.
50. See generally Commission to Study Foreign Investment in the United States Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law, American Bar Ass'n, A Guide to Foreign
Investment Under United States Law 1-21 (1979) [hereinafter cited as A Guide to Foreign
Investment]. The federal interest has developed due, in large part, to the fact that foreign
capital rapidly became a critical factor in the early development of the United States. Id. at
3. The American Colonies originated as exercises in foreign investment, and dependence of
investment from abroad continued through American history. Id. at 2. This dependence
has, however, generated fears of foreign investment and of undue foreign influence. These
seemingly incongruous positions have resulted in a "go away, get closer" attitude toward
foreign investment. This attitude is reflected in periodic fluctuations between nationalism,
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in preserving the free flow of transnational investment capital and in
promoting international relations.

Moreover, it is uncertain whether federal regulation in this area
would significantly improve the current state regulatory system. Federal statutes, such as FIRPTA and AFIDA, have limited effectiveness.

FIRPTA only equalizes the tax treatment of foreign and domestic
land investors; AFIDA is merely a disclosure requirement and, as
such, can be circumvented easily. 5 1 New federal legislation might succeed in achieving uniformity among the states,5 2 but would sacrifice

the flexibility that is available in a state system. This flexibility is tremendously valuable because it allows different approaches to foreign
53
land investment in areas with different needs.

B.

STATE STATUTES

State legislation is the most prevalent source of regulation of foreign land investment, and state laws concerning foreigners' investment
in land are disparate and varied. These laws can significantly
which represents fear of foreign influence, and investment attraction, which recognizes its
importance. For example, following World War II, United States policies supported the
free flow of international capital. These policies would seem to encourage foreign investment in American real estate. See, e.g., Mutual Security Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-665,
§ 413, 68 Stat. 832, 846 (1954):
The Congress recognizes the vital role of free enterprise in achieving rising levels of
production and standards of living essential to the economic progress and defensive
strength of the free world. Accordingly, it is declared to be the policy of the
United States to encourage the efforts of other free nations to increase the flow of
international trade, to foster private initiative and competition, to discourage
monopolistic practices, to improve the technical efficiency of their industry, agriculture and commerce, and to strengthen free labor unions; . . .
See also, A Guide to Foreign Investment, supra,at 9.
Foreign investment in American real estate became more attractive in the 1970's, due to
the declining value of the U.S. dollar. It also generated public concern about "foreign
takeovers." See U.S. Realty Continues to Tempt Foreigners,Bus. WK., Oct. 1, 1979, at 5154; ForeignersScramblefor a Piece ofAmerica, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Dec. 6, 1982,
at 80. See also supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. As a result, the most recent
federal attempts to regulate foreign investment have resulted from a popular concern about
the influence of foreign capital, notwithstanding continuous governmental willingness to
attract such investment.
51. See generally Azevedo, Foreign DirectInvestment in U.S. Real Estate: A Survey of
Federal and State Entry Level Regulation, 7 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. RFG. 27, 30-31
(1982);
[I]t is unlikely that the Secretary of Agriculture in fact could compel a foreign
holding company to disclose the "true" holders of control of U.S. agricultural
property if the representatives of the holding companies were outside the federal
government's jurisdiction.
Id. at 30 (example at page 31).
52. But see Note, Our Land is Your Land: Ineffective State Restriction of Alien Land
Ownership and the Needfor FederalLegislation, 13 J. MAR. L. REV. 679, 714-715 (1980)
(concluding that federal legislation would provide uniformity and preempt conflicting state
law, but addressing neither the need for flexibility nor the concern for local communities'
needs).
53. See infra note 74.
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encourage or discourage foreign investment. This section describes
the current array of state statutory and constitutional provisions concerning foreign land investment.
The states that treat foreign land investors most favorably grant
these investors all ownership rights enjoyed by citizens. States may
convey these rights in the form of a statute, such as the Idaho Code,
which expressly grants to any person, citizen, or alien, the right to
hold and dispose of real or personal property. 54 Alternatively, some
states place this type of guarantee in their constitutions. The California Constitution, for example, states that "non-citizens have the same
' 55
property rights as citizens."
Other states have attempted to exclude foreign land ownership
altogether. For example, Oklahoma traditionally has fostered a harsh
anti-alien policy, including a constitutional proscription against alien
land ownership. 56 Historically, nearly every state at some time has
54. IDAHO CODE § 55-103 (1979) ("Any person, whether citizen or alien, may take,
hold and dispose of property, real or personal."). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 306
(1975) ("All real and personal property situate in this State may be taken, acquired, held
and disposed of by an alien in the same manner as by a citizen of this State."); MICH.
ComP. LAWS ANN. § 554.135-136 (West 1967); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 451
(1978); 1977 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184, § 1 (Law. Co-op. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 471-4 (1978); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 10 (McKinney 1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-2-1
(1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-2-101 (1982); W. VA. CODE § 36-1-21 (1985); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 477:20 (1983).
55. CAL. CONST. art. I § 20 (non-citizens have the same property rights as citizens).
These rights are also provided for in the civil code. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 671 (West 1982)
("Any person, whether citizen or alien, may take, hold, and dispose of property, real or
personal, within this state"); See also ALA. CONST. of 1901 art. I, § 34 (1975) (foreigners
who are, or may become residents of this state enjoy the same rights in respect to...
property as native born citizens); COLO. CONST. art. II, § 27 (Aliens, who are or may
hereafter become bona fide residents of this state, may acquire, inherit, possess, enjoy and
dispose of property, real or personal, as native born citizens); FLA. Const. art. I, § 2 (all
natural persons are equal before law and have inalienable rights, among which [is] the right
to.. . acquire, possess and protect property, except ownership, inheritance, disposition
and possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law); MICH. CONST. art. 10, § 6 (Aliens who are residents of this state shall
enjoy the same rights and privileges in property as citizens).
56. See OKLA. CONST. art. 22, § 1. But see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 122 (West
1971). The Oklahoma Constitution, at art. 22, § 1, supra provides: "No alien or person
who is not a citizen of the United States, shall acquire title to or own land in this state
...
" The Oklahoma constitutional provision provides, however, that "This shall not
apply... to aliens or persons not citizens of the United States who may become bona fide
residents of this state: And provided further that this section shall not apply to lands now
owned by aliens in this state." The Oklahoma Statutes clarify and expand the exception in
the Constitution. After codifying the constitutional provision at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60,
§ 121, the Oklahoma law states at § 122: "This article shall not apply to lands now owned
in this state by aliens. . . nor to any alien who is or shall take up bonafide residence in this
State: and any alien who is or shall become a bona fide resident of the State of Oklahoma
shall have the right to acquire and hold lands in this State upon the same terms as citizens
of the State. . . during the continuance of such bona fide residence of such alien in this
State.. ." (emphasis supplied).
Thus, while Oklahoma possesses the reputation among many commentators and
lawmakers for being strongly anti-alien, it actually is no more restrictive than the several
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considered or enacted anti-alien investment legislation. In the early
twentieth century, for example, many Western states prohibited alien
land ownership, particularly by aliens of East Asian descent. Many
states enacted laws excluding "aliens ineligible for citizenship" from
owning land; Asians were the only racial class ineligible for
57
citizenship.
The vast majority of state alien land holding laws lie between the
two extremes of xenophobic prohibition and sweeping guarantees.
Most states regulate foreign land investment with more moderate
measures than outright prohibition. In order to accomplish these
goals, most states draw distinctions between different types of foreign
land investment. For example, many states distinguish between resident and nonresident aliens, often categorically prohibiting land
investment by the latter. Twenty-one states base their statutory distinctions in the treatment of land ownership and investment on alien
residence.58 The effect of these regulatory distinctions varies from forstates which prohibit or regulate nonresident alien land investment. See also infra note 58
and accompanying text.
57. See Morrison, supra note 48, at 626-27. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-511 (1981).
See generallyMorrison at 626-28; See also Comment, 10 CALIF. L. REv. 241 (1921-22). In
California, immigration of Japanese and other people of Asian heritage increased after
1900, and the immigrants began to conduct farming operations in the Central Valley of
California. Popular pressure called for legislation which would curb the influx of immigrants. California voters approved an initiative in 1913, and again in 1920, that made
eligibility for landholding rights depend upon eligibility for U.S. citizenship. At the time,
federal immigration laws prevented Japanese aliens from obtaining citizenship. The California law was declared valid by the United States Supreme Court in Porterfield v. Webb,
263 U.S. 225 (1923), and thus became a model for other racist and xenophobic legislation
throughout the West. The California statute was finally repealed in 1955. 1913 CAL.
STAT. 113, repealed by 1955 CAL. STAT. 1550.
58. See ALASKA STAT. § 22.15.110(4) (1982) (district judges and magistrates must
report all conveyances of real property to nonresident aliens); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 47-58 (West 1978) (nonresident aliens may acquire and hold real estate for mining purposes but lose land if not so used for 10 consecutive years); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 2069(c)(1) (1976) (land held by state board of land and natural resources may only be sold to
U.S. citizens or aliens resident in Hawaii at least five years); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-1-8-2
(Burns 1980) (aliens acquiring lands of more than 320 acres must either become citizen of
U.S. or convey lands within five years, or face escheat to state); IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.3
(West Supp. 1983) (nonresident alien, foreign business or foreign government may not
purchase or acquire agricultural land, unless the land is acquired by devise or descent, or
does not exceed 320 acres and is acquired for immediate use other than farming); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 381.320-30 (Baldwin 1979) (resident alien may hold lands for purpose of
residence or business for up to twenty-one years; nonresident alien who inherits land may
hold and alienate land up to eight years after settlement of decedent's estate); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 500.221 (West Supp. 1984) (no individual may acquire interest in agricultural land
unless citizen or resident alien of United States; no corporation or similar entity may
acquire interest in agricultural land unless 80% of each class of stock issued and outstanding or 80% of ultimate beneficial interest of entity is held by citizens or permanent resident
aliens of United States); Mss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1973) (resident aliens may acquire
and hold land as citizens of state; nonresident aliens may not acquire or hold land unless
held for less than 20 years as security for or in satisfaction of debt); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 442.571, 442.586 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (no alien individual or foreign corporation may
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bidding nonresident aliens from holding land to merely subjecting
nonresidents to a reporting requirement similar to AFIDA. 59

Another common distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural land holding appears in some alien land investment laws.

Missouri, for example, allows aliens to hold non-agricultural land
interests. 6° The Missouri Code forbids nonresident aliens from holding more than five acres of agricultural land for longer than two
62
years, 61 unless the land is to be used for a non-agricultural purpose.
Ten states make some distinction between agricultural and non-agrihold agricultural land unless such alien has or shall take up bona fide residence in the
United States); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 477:20 (1983) (an alien resident in the state may
take, purchase, and hold real estate, which may descend as if he were a citizen); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 47-10.1-02 (Supp. 1983) (person who is not a citizen of the United States or
Canada and not permanent resident of U.S. may not acquire agricultural land; business or
corporate entity may not acquire agricultural land unless ultimate beneficial interest held
by U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien of U.S.; prohibition does not apply to agricultural land acquired for security or enforcement of debt or for use as an industrial site);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5301.25.4 (Page 1981) (nonresident alien acquiring land in
excess of three acres or with market value greater than $100,000 must file report with
Secretary of State; any corporation business entity that is created outside Ohio or has its
principal place of business in a foreign nation, in which nonresident alien has at least 10%
of stock, must file report with Secretary of State, provided land is greater than $100,000 in
value or more than three acres); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 121, 122 (West 1971) (no
alien may acquire title to land in state unless he is or shall become a bona fide resident of
state or was an owner of land at time statute was enacted); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 41, 43 (Purdon Supp. 1984) (nonresident alien or foreign government shall not acquire
interest in agricultural land exceeding 100 acres, unless citizen, foreign government, or
subject of country whose rights in land are secured by treaty, or unless bona fide resident of
some state or territory of United States); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-2A-2 (1983) (no
alien not a resident of state, or of state or territory of United States, and no foreign government shall acquire agricultural land exceeding 160 acres, unless property rights acquired by
devise or inheritance, held as security for indebtedness, or secured by treaty); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 710.02 (West 1981) (alien not resident of state or of state or territory of United
States, or corporation not created under laws of United States may not acquire, hold or
own more than 640 acres of land; no corporation more than 20% of the stock of which is
owned by nonresident alien may hold more than 640 acres of land); Wyo. STAT. § 34-15101 (1977) (nonresident aliens not eligible for citizenship may not acquire, possess, enjoy,
use, transfer, or inherit real property unless foreign country of which nonresident alien is
citizen allows citizens of United States a reciprocal right).
States which condition alien land ownership rights upon residence in the state must necessarily recognize residence in another state of the United States as meeting this requirement by reason of the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 1. Moreover, denying citizens of one state the right to own property in another state
would violate equal protection guarantees. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
59. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-57, 47-58 (West 1983) (nonresidents, other than
citizens of France, may only hold real estate for mining purposes and may lose land if not
so used for 10 consecutive years). See also OHIO RIv. CODE ANN. § 5301.254 (Page 1981).
See also supra, notes 43-47, and accompanying text.
60. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.560 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
61. Id § 442.586.
62. Id § 442.591. See also IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. I, § 22 (1846); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 567.1 (West 1950); (aliens residing in Iowa have same rights as citizens; nonresidents may acquire and hold property within city or town limits and may also acquire up to
320 acres outside of city limits).
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cultural or urban property.6 3 As in the case of residential distinctions,
4
the severity of these laws varies considerably.6
Some states also regulate foreign corporate ownership of real
estate. Many states, for example, apply their nonresident alien invest-

ment restrictions to all corporations that are substantially owned or
controlled by foreigners.65 Some states prohibit corporations organized outside the United States from owning land.6 6 A few states have
restrictions on corporate land ownership that apply to both domestic
and foreign corporations. 67 In all, thirteen state codes include some
distinction between domestic and foreign corporations with respect to
63. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, § 603 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85) (any foreign individual or corporation with substantial foreign control carrying any interest in agricultural land
must report to state officials); IOWA CODE ANN. § 567.1 (West Supp. 1984-85); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 500.221 subd. 2 (West Supp. 1984) (nonresident aliens and corporations,
partnerships, and associations more than 20% of which is owned by aliens may not
purchase any interest in agricultural land); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 442.560, 442.566 (Vernon
Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-402, 76-414 (1981) (aliens and foreign corporations
may not hold lands outside city or village limits); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-10.1-02 (Supp.
1983) (no nonresident alien may acquire direct or indirect interest in agricultural land;
partnerships, and legal entities barred from holding agricultural land unless interest in
entity is held by citizens resident aliens); OKLA. CONST. art. 22,

§

1 (West 1981); OKLA.

ANN. tit. 18, § 951 (West Supp. 1984-85) (foreign corporations may not engage in
farming or ranching); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., § 41 (Purdon Supp. 1983-84) (nonresident aliens and foreign governments may not hold more than 100 acres of agricultural land
unless acquired by devise, inheritance, or as security for debt); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-43220(d)(1)(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) (property tax rate of 6% for agricultural land held
by corporations which have nonresident alien shareholders whereas normal tax rate is 4%);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 43-2A-2 (1983) (no nonresident alien or foreign government
may purchase more than 160 acres of agricultural land).
64. See supra note 63.
65. See, eg. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.190(4), (6) (1984) (alien individuals may acquire
mineral rights if their country grants similar privileges to U.S. citizens; corporations more
than half-owned by aliens restricted in acquisition of state mineral lands). See also IOWA
CODE ANN. § 567.2 (West Supp. 1984-85) (foreign corporations, like alien individuals, may
not purchase agricultural land); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 500.221 subd. 2 (West Supp. 1984)
(corporations, partnerships, and associations more than 20% alien-owned may not
purchase agricultural land); MIss. CODE ANN. § 29-1-75 (1972) (corporations and associations having nonresident alien participation may not purchase public land); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 442.571 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (aliens and corporations controlled by nonresident
aliens prohibited from acquiring tracts of agricultural land larger than five acres).
66. See, eg., NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-402 (1981) (aliens and corporations not incorporated under the laws of Nebraska are prohibited from holding land for more than five
years). But see NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-414 (1981) and § 76-404 (Cum. Supp. 1984) (prohibition of alien and foreign corporate land ownership does not apply to land within corporate limits of a city, to lands within three miles of city limits, to manufacturing and
industrial lands or to oil and gas leases).
67. See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-402, -406 (1981) (no corporation may permanently
hold land if majority of directors are aliens or if majority of stock is owned by aliens); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 10-06-01, -07 (1976 & Supp. 1983) (no corporation may engage in farming;
domestic corporations may be exempted if family-run, small-scale farms); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 951-955 (West Supp. 1983-84) (corporations generally may not engage in
farming; exception for small family-run operations); W. VA. CODE § 11-12-75 (1983) (all
corporations which acquire more than 10,000 acres of land in the state must acquire license
and pay tax of $0.05 per acre for each acre in excess of 10,000).
STAT.
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foreign investment in real property. 68 This distinction is significant for
two reasons: first, corporate entities account for much of the foreign

investment activity in U.S. land, 69 and second, if legislation is poorly
drafted, a foreigner may use the corporate-individual distinction as an
70

easy way to avoid regulation.
Finally, some states regulate foreign real estate investment by
placing ceilings on foreign investment rather than by drawing the statutory distinctions discussed above. In some cases, states limit the
number of acres foreigners are entitled to hold. 7 1 In other cases, the

limitation is a maximum number of years that an investor may hold
land. 72 The severity of limitation also varies among these states.
Although state treatment of foreign real estate investment leads
to few generalizations, some conclusions are noteworthy. First,
notwithstanding a small number of limited federal statutes, the regulation of foreign investment in U.S. real estate is a creature of state law68. See ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.190(4), (6) (1984) (aliens and associations of aliens may
acquire exploration and mining rights only if their country grants like privileges to U.S.
citizens); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, § 2901 (Smith-Hurd 1981) (foreign corporations which
may acquire property by foreclosure may not hold real estate longer than 5 years); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 567.2 (West Supp. 1984-85) (corporation organized under laws of foreign
countries, and alien individual, may not purchase agricultural land); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 500.221-2 (West Supp. 1984) (corporations, partnerships, and associations more than
20% owned by aliens may not purchase any interest in agricultural land); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 29-1-75 (1972) (corporations and associations having any nonresident alien participation may not purchase public lands); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 442.566, 442.571 (Vernon
Supp. 1984) (corporations controlled by nonresident aliens prohibited from acquiring tracts
of agricultural land larger than five acres); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 76-402, -406 (1981) (no
corporation may permanently hold land if majority of directors are alien, if executive directors are aliens, or if majority of stock is owned by aliens); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-06-01,
10-06-04, 47-10.1-02 (Supp. 1983) (no corporation may engage in farming unless it is a
small, domestic, family-run entity; foreign corporations and business entities may acquire
agricultural land for industrial purpose); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 951 (West Supp.
1984-85); OKLA. CONST. art. 22, § 2; 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., § 2012 (Purdon Supp.
1984-85) (foreign corporations may hold lands as domestic corporations, thereby exempting them from 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., § 41 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85), which limits alien
acquisition of land to 100 acres); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-13-30 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (corporation controlled by aliens may own no more than 500,000 acres of land); S.D. CONST. art.
17, § 7 (no corporation shall hold real estate except for its legitimate business); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 710.02 (West Supp. 1984-85) (corporations and associations of which 20% or more
of stock owned by nonresident aliens may not acquire or hold more than 640 acres).
69. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
71. See, eg., 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 41 (Purdon Supp. 1983) (aliens may purchase
and hold up to 100 acres of real property of any type in Pennsylvania). See also S.C. CODE
ANN. § 27-13-30 (Law Co-op. 1976) (no alien or corporation controlled by aliens may own
more than 500,000 acres of land). Foreign investors, acting individually or through corporate entities, are free to invest in as much as half a million acres of South Carolina land,
either agricultural or urban.
72. See eg., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 6, §§ 1-2 (Supp. 1983) (aliens have full rights to
acquire land, either by purchase or inheritance, but must dispose of it within six years or
face forced sale by state). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 77.2201-2211 (1981) (alien investors
must register real estate holdings with state after ten years).
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making and will likely remain so. Second, current state foreign land

investment regulations are complex and lack uniformity. States vary
in the severity of their limitations. 73 Some states invite foreign invest-

ment capital to all forms of land, while others clearly state that foreign
money in real estate is not welcome. Also, states have various means
74
of attracting or dissuading investment.
III.

THE NEED FOR CHANGE

The current status of federal and state regulation of foreign
investment in U.S. real property demonstrates the need for change and
innovation. Careful analysis of the failings of existing legislation and
the interests that land investment laws should serve indicates that the
proper remedy lies in a uniform foreign land investment law, which all
states should adopt.7 5 Before addressing such a law, however, it is
important to analyze the need for statutory change and to outline the

considerations that should inform any legislative innovation.
Sensible regulation of foreign investment in U.S. real property
should balance the detriments and benefits of foreign land investment.
Foreign land ownership is prevalent in many communities, 76 and the
resulting local problems generally have been ignored. Effective regula-

tion and, when necessary, restriction of foreign land investment should

preserve the benefits to capital structure and local economies 7 7 that

derive from investment while minimizing the potential damage from
78

overinvestment.
The current body of federal and state law does not adequately
address these concerns. Furthermore, existing laws do not really
address the true need for foreign land investment regulation-the need
73. See Azevedo, supra note 51, at 35-47. Azevedo classifies state regulations into
three categories: (1) states which are non-restrictive, either granting alien investors the
rights of citizens or not mentioning any positive guarantee or restriction; (2) mildly restrictive states, whose restrictions "do not constitute a substantial barrier to most alien investors." I at 36; and (3) severely restrictive states, with major "but not insurmountable"
barriers to foreign land investment.
74. For example, a state with a very large amount of agricultural land might adopt a
heavily restrictive alien land investment statute in the hope of preserving agricultural land,
and preventing agribusiness from falling under foreign corporate control. See, e.g., IOWA
CODE § 567.2 (West Supp. 1983) ("Nonresident alien, foreign business or foreign government may acquire... real property except agricultural land"); see also NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 76-414 (1981) (restrictions in NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-402, which prohibit aliens and foreign corporations from owning agricultural land, do not apply to lands within the corporate limits of cities and villages).
75. See infra notes 111-32 and accompanying text.
76. For example, Washington, D.C. is one of the most heavily invested urban areas in
the United States. Foreign investors are involved in between 10-30 percent of all the commercial real estate development and acquisitions in Washington. Washington Post, Sept.
17, 1983, at E-21, col. c.
77. See infra note 107.
78. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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to channel foreign capital into areas where it will be beneficial and
away from areas where it might be detrimental. Instead, existing laws
primarily reflect xenophobia.
A.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION

In examining federal laws, 79 it is not clear that recent restrictions
were promulgated as a result of genuine, objective concern for the
problems that foreign investment in real property causes. In AFIDA,

Congress sought to gather information, but the legislative history indicates an unsubstantiated preconception that foreign investment in
farmland is harmful. 80 Similarly, Congress' motive in enacting
FIRPTA stemmed less from a concern for the damaging effects of foreign investment than from a desire to eliminate long-standing tax loopholes that gave foreign investors a great advantage over their domestic
counterparts. 81 Therefore, Congress did not actually enact FIRPTA
79. Federal enactments, such as FIRPTA and AFIDA, are the source of the most
completely documented legislative histories. It is more difficult to discern clear intent
behind state laws. Nonetheless, this reasoning apparently applies to all existing alien land
regulation.
80. If farm income leaves the country and local businesses are bypassed in the
purchase of agricultural imputs for the absentee-owned farming operations, the
adverse effect on the economic and social vitality of rural communities is obvious
....
If foreign investment effects. . . changes in the structure of the U.S. on a
broad enough scale, it is argued, this may be reflected in higher food costs to consumers. The contentions raise serious and complex questions that require careful
and responsible analysis.
H.R. REP. No. 1570, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2914, 2917.
See also statement of Hon. John Krebs, H.R. REP. No. 1570, supra, at 29, 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2937:

The effect [of foreign investors inflating the price of land by their willingness to pay
prices above current market rates for U.S. agricultural land] on the family farmers
can be disastrous, reducing the ability of young farmers to purchase farmland, and
preventing marginal farmers from expanding in order to succeed in their present
operations.
Id. See also statements of Hon. Hon. Charles E. Grassley, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra at 2936-38.
81. The report of the House Ways and Means Committee on FIRPTA noted that the
purpose of the act was to equalize the tax treatment of foreign and domestic real estate
investors:
The committee believes that it is essential to establish equity of tax treatment in
U.S. real property between foreign and domestic investors. The committee does
not intend the provisions of Title IX to impose a penalty on foreign investors or to
discourage foreign investors from investing in the United States. However, the
committee believes that the United States should not continue to provide an
inducement through the tax laws for foreign investment in U.S. real property
which affords the foreign investor a number of mechanisms to minimize or eliminate his tax on income from the property while at the same time effectively
exempting himself from U.S. tax on the gain realized on disposition of the property.
H.R. REP. No. 96-1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 511, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5526, 5874.
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to reduce incentives for foreign investment. 82
Federal regulation suffers from systemic limitations greater in
scope than the discrepancies between the purposes and effects of
AFIDA and FIRPTA. There is great reluctance to regulate foreign
investment at a federal level. This reluctance stems, at least in part,
from the constitutional theory of enumerated and implied powers.
Traditionally, federal lawmakers have felt that federal land use planning would be unconstitutional because it was not a power enumerated
in the Constitution's grant of powers to Congress. 83 Land use plan84
ning was considered to be an inherent power, reserved to the states.
AFIDA and FIRPTA are recent exceptions to the federal practice of
avoiding the foreign land investment issue. 85 Any widespread federal

regulation of foreign land investment that is capable of remedying the
shortcomings of existing legislation would probably be an unconstitu86
tional abrogation of states' rights.

B.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF STATE LEGISLATION

State laws on foreign land investment present problems that are

distinct in many ways from those arising from federal laws. State laws
do not suffer the same failings as federal laws, but they do combine to
82. Contra Note, Foreign Investment in United States Real Estate: Congress Acts to
Reduce Incentives, 7 INT'L TRADE L.J. 150 (1982).
83. Recently, the federal government has engaged in land use planning and regulation,
but only under specific constitutional grants of power such as the commerce clause or in
geographical areas under federal control, such as geothermal steam resources, grazing
lands, or homestead lands. See supra Section II(A). The area-specific approach to foreign
land investment regulation has been utilized on the federal level with some success. The
most recent example of this approach is found in the area of agricultural land, where it is
fairly certain that a legitimate interest in the federal restriction of alien land control exists.
See supra notes 17, 44-46, 37-39 and accompanying text. See also Committee Print, supra
note 50. Other federal enactments have restricted the rights of foreigners to own federally
controlled lands, such as geothermal steam resources, 30 U.S.C. § 1015 (1982); homestead
land, 43 U.S.C. § 161 (1976); 43 C.F.R. § 2511.1 (1983); grazing land, 43 U.S.C. § 315(b)
(1976); 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1 (1983); and mineral land, 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 181 (1982). See also
Morrison, supra note 48, at 630 & nn. 55-58. See also supra notes 48-50 and accompanying
text.
84. Land-use planning has traditionally been seen as a local concern reserved to the
states by the tenth amendment to the Constitution. For example, in United States v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville, 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935), the court held that the
federal government did not have the power of eminent domain for purposes of slum clearance and urban renewal. Zoning was upheld as an exercise of the states' police power in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
In the late twentieth century the federal government has increased its regulatory activity
in this area. Under the authority of the commerce power, Congress has regulated environmental quality, housing, and many other areas that relate to urban planning. See, e.g.,
Urban Growth & New Community Development Act of 1970, P.L. No. 91-609, 84 Stat.
1770 (1971) (included in Title VII of the Housing & Urban Development Act of 1970).
Nonetheless, federal regulation in the area of land-use planning is still limited.
85. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
86. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.

166

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:147

present a complex, often conflicting statutory framework that may create a greater disincentive to investment than the individual laws themselves. In other words, state laws in the United States present foreign
investors with an obstacle that may seem to be impenetrable by virtue
of its complexity. In some instances, this disincentive may be misplaced, because it is not consciously directed at rationally controlling
investment.8 7 State law, in many cases, does not balance the harms
and benefits of foreign investment, but instead grows out of
xenophobia. 8s
There was little, if any, evaluation of the effects of foreign real
estate investment when earlier alien land laws were enacted. 9 Discouragement, when explicitly intended, may be a desirable legislative
goal, but the non-uniformity and misdirection of state law creates an
unintended disincentive. A better approach would be to balance the
economic attractions 90 and the potentially harmful local effects of foreign investment. 9 1
Another problem with the existing state laws is that they are
often weak and easily circumvented. In many cases, local incorporation in a state earns a foreign corporation resident status, and thereby
avoids land ownership restrictions. For example, Illinois limits nonresident aliens who hold property to a maximum ownership period of
six years, after which time the property must be transferred to a U.S.
citizen. 92 Because the statute does not mention corporations and other
legal entities, these "persons" are not subject to the six-year limitation. 93 Hence, a foreign individual may incorporate in Illinois (or any
other state) solely for the purpose of holding real property which, if
held by an individual, would have to be transferred after six years.
Thus, the seemingly strong regulation does not reach investors who
hold land as a corporation, partnership, or limited partnership. Cir87. For example, AFIDA discourages foreign investment in agricultural land by placing disclosure requirements on agricultural land investment activity. This is an outgrowth
of the arguably rational fear that a large portion of U.S. farmland may be under foreign
control, and of a desire for more information. The complexity of state alien land laws, on
the other hand, could serve to discourage all foreign land investment, including harmless or
even beneficial investment areas where foreign land ownership is benign and capital rejuvenation helps revitalize depressed areas.
88. See supra note 24.
89. See, e.g., Atkinson & Jones Should ForeignersOwn Our Land?, reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION AND FORESTRY, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS., FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL LAND 57 (Comm. Print 1979)

[hereinafter cited as Committee Print].
90. See Ricks and Racster, Restrictions on Foreign Ownership of U.S. Real Estate,
REAL ESTATE ISSUES, Spring 1980, at 111, 112.
91. See supra note 25.
92. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 6, § 2 (Smith-Hurd 1975).
93. Id
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cumvention by incorporation is also possible in Connecticut, 94 Indiana, 95 Pennsylvania, 96 and Kansas. 97 An effective system of
regulation must be strong enough to regulate many different types of

foreign investment without being undermined by such simple evasion.
These concerns illustrate the need for flexible, conscientious local

treatment of foreign land investment that also recognizes the particular needs of local communities. In addition, there must be some uniformity throughout the United States to facilitate investment activity
in areas where it will be beneficial, or at least not harmful. Current
federal and state regulation of foreign investment in U.S. real property
is counterproductive to these goals.
Moreover, state laws are ineffective at curtailing all the harmful
effects of foreign land investment. For example, although many states
have built statutory schemes designed to prevent foreign takeovers of
farmland, these statutes often ignore a more severe danger-excessive

conversion of agricultural land to urban uses by foreign investment
interests. The Iowa law, for example, forbids nonresident aliens from
holding any agricultural land, 9 8 but is silent on the conversion of agricultural land to nonfarming uses by foreign investors. An effective
foreign land investment law should avoid these statutory failings by
incorporating forceful terms where necessary and by explicitly defining a foreign investor to include local corporate entities controlled by
foreigners. 99
94. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-57, 58 (West 1978). See also Azevedo, supra note
51, at 37.
95. IND. CODE § 32-1-8-2 (Burns 1980). See also Azevedo, supranote 51, at 41; Morrison, supra note 73, at 77.
96. 68 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 28, 32 (Purdon 1965); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2012 (Purdon Supp. 1984).
97. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-511 (1976).
98. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 567.1-567.4 (West 1984).
99. There is a significant amount of latitude in the strength with which an alien land
investment law may be drafted. For example, AFIDA has a strong definition of a foreign
investor, allowing few activities to avoid the law. AFIDA, at 7 U.S.C. § 3508, defines a
"foreign person" as
"(A) any individual (i) who is not a citizen or national of the United States;
(ii) who is not a citizen of the Northern Mariana Islands or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; or
(ii)
who is not lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence, or paroled into the United States, under the Immigration and
Nationality Act [8 U.S.C. §§ 1101- et. seq.];
(B) any person, other than an individual or a government, which is created or
organized under the laws of a foreign government or which has its principal
place of business located outside of all the States;
(C) any person, other than an individual or a government(i) which is created or organized under the laws of any State; and
(ii) in which, as determined by the Secretary [of Agriculture] under regulations which the Secretary shall prescribe, a significant interest or substantial control is directly or indirectly held -
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State law does regulate foreign real estate investment adequately
in some instances. In fact, state legislation can be the best solution to
the issue of foreign land investment, notwithstanding the problems of
non-uniformityc ° and inapplicability.1 0 1 The harms and benefits of2
10
foreign land investment have their greatest impact on a local level;
thus, state law can balance the harms and benefits more effectively
than a single body of federal law. The existing laws, however, do not
10 3
presently recognize these local concerns.
(I) by any individual referred to in subparagraph (A);
(II) by any person referred to in subparagraph (B);
(III) by any foreign government; or
(IV) by any combination of such individuals, persons, or governments;
and
(D) any foreign government;"
7 U.S.C. § 3508(3) (1982).

The act also broadly and explicitly defines a "person" as: "any individual, corporation,
company, association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock company, trust, estate, or any
other legal entity." 15 U.S.C. § 3508(4).
The methods of circumvention discussed in footnotes 92-97, supra may not be utilized to
avoid the provisions of AFIDA. The Act anticipates the use of these entities for the avoidance of the statutory provisions. In drafting a uniform law, great care must be taken to
assure that a strong definition of foreign investment, like that used in AFIDA, is adopted.
100. See supra notes 54-57, 73-74 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
102. One example of the effects of foreign investment is found in the recent investment
in American manufacturing plants by foreign automobile manufacturers, e.g., Volkswagenwerks of Germany's automobile manufacturing plant in New Stanton, Pennsylvania. "Locally, many still question whether it will be the great economic stimulant for
this rural region that people have been asked to believe. With employment at the plant,
situated on the outskirts of New Stanton, expected to reach 45,000... some people say
the only thing they can see now is traffic jams, more motels and fast food businesses
encroaching on a serene countryside." N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 1978, at 51.
Moreover, the peculiarities of foreign exchange rates and the instability of economic
bases in other countries create risks in land investment which are not present for domestic
investors. These risks are also felt on a local scale. The devaluation of the Mexican peso in
1982 affected Mexican land investment in Southern California so greatly that many largescale residential developments went bankrupt. "Several financial analysts say that the
'Golden Mile'-the high-rise condominium canyon along Wilshire Boulevard between
Westwood Boulevard and the Los Angeles Country Club [in Los Angeles, California]sailed into financial straits partly because the devaluation and restrictions curbed Mexican
spending just as property developers were counting on them as customers." Peso: Quiet
Immigrant; Wealthy Mexicans Invest in Southland, Los Angeles Times, October 16, 1983,
pt. VII (Real Estate), at 1.
Many of the projects in the strip of condominium developments described above are now
bankrupt; many of the buildings are almost completely vacant, and some projects went sour
and left merely a hole in the ground. It is unclear precisely what caused this phenomenon,
but the large proportion of foreign investment involved in many of the projects probably
played a major role. Domestic investment would have been just as susceptible to poor
market planning or recissionary consumer reactions, but the peso devaluation is one example of how foreign investment compounded the negative effects on the local scale.
103. While blatant examples of racist legislation have virtually been eliminated from
state statute books, the undercurrents of xenophobia remain. It is therefore critical to any
discussion of alien land investment regulation that careful attention be paid to the possible
harms and benefits of foreign investment, as well as the potential for irrational lawmaking.
As noted supra, it is conceivable that foreign control of the U.S. food supply could prove
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Although it is conceivable that foreign investment should be discouraged in certain areas, some foreign investment in U.S. real estate
should be encouraged.104 States and local communities might attract
foreign investment through land-related incentives, such as property
tax exemptions and favorable zoning variances.105 Moreover, foreign
investment may be detrimental to one geographic area and yet be beneficial to another. Land ownership regulation must reflect local concerns 10 6 and in fact should recognize geographic factors, such as
detrimental to American interests. However, there is little evidence indicating that a foreign owner of an apartment, an office building, a shopping center, or any other form of
urban land investment poses danger to American security. That is, while alien land investment restrictions may make rational sense in terms of protecting American agribusiness
and preserving control of food supplies, there does not seem to be much danger in foreign
control of most urban land uses. Of course, there may be particular urban areas to which
foreign investment might be dangerous, and a good statutory scheme must be flexible
enough to accommodate specific geographic areas and allow restriction or encouragement
of foreign investment in specific areas. See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
State legislatures, sitting amidst the "firing lines" of the foreign investment arena, are
arguably more susceptible to pressures or persuasion by xenophobic or racist constituencies. This is evidenced clearly by the early alien land laws enacted in California and other
western states. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. See also Morrison supra note 48,
at 625-29.
For the most part, those laws which have restricted foreign investment activity in agricultural land have been more rational than those dealing with urban land, or those which
have not made any type of distinction. In the agricultural sphere, there is a legitimate,
albeit subjective, concern: control of the U.S. food supply by foreign interests could conceivably pose a threat to U.S. security. Moreover, there is evidence that foreign investors
have different demands and harbor different strategies of investment than their U.S. counterparts. See generally Roulac, supra note 11. Therefore, laws like AFIDA are rationally
founded, and when sensibly applied (as is AFIDA, which seeks only to gather information
at this stage), are not objectionable.
104. The most common forms of encouragement offered to foreign investors are tax
incentives given by local communities to attract investors. The recent activities of many
foreign automobile manufacturers in establishing American assembly plants is a good
example. While this type of land use (factories, assembly plants) may not suggest significant local benefits in the abstract, an entire manufacturing operation, including added jobs,
services, revenue, etc., can revitalize declining communities. See, eg., N.Y.TMEs, Apr. 11,
1978, supra note 102. See also infra note 107 and accompanying text. See generally THE
CONFERENCE BOARD,

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN

THE UNITED

STATES:

POLICY,

PROBLEMS AND OBSTACLES 32-40 (1974) [hereinafter cited as THE CONFERENCE BOARD].

105. THE CONFERENCE BOARD, supra note 104, at 36.
106. Two of the most common examples of possible local concerns about foreign investment in real estate are absenteeism and competition. There may be cases in which the
location of a landlord abroad changes the landlord-tenant relationship so greatly that foreign ownership should in fact be discouraged. In the residential context, tenants might not
be able to contact a landlord in Europe or Asia, and would have to conduct business
through a local representative. This complicates the tenural relationship and certainly
increases price. In the commercial setting, the distance between tenant and absentee landlord hinders the negotiation and transaction processes.
Preservation of local markets is another concern which underlies the competition argument against foreign investment. The injection of foreign investors (often with large
amounts of ready cash) into local markets can force smaller investors out of the market.
Some critics also complain that since foreigners are often willing to pay a higher price for
U.S. land, prices become severely inflated in areas where there is a lot of foreign land
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unemployment rates or housing markets. 107

An effective land investment law should be binary-composed of
both a discouragement or restrictive element and an encouragement
element. In this way, both incentive and regulatory activities could be

tailored to the needs of local communities. Regulation would remain
uniform and be accessible to foreign investors who are making loca-

tion decisions. The solution is a uniform foreign land investment law,
drafted by a committee of practitioners experienced in the fields of real
estate law and international investment and then adopted by all the

states. A uniform law would alleviate the problem of non-uniformity. 1°8 Moreover, a binary law would allow a tremendous degree of
flexibility and could provide a superior means of meeting local needs
than those that existing state codes provide. Such a law could success-

fully regulate foreign investment in areas in which federal and state
attempts have failed.' 0 9 The drafters of an effective uniform law could

avoid the defects in current regulatory schemes if they first carefully
examine the possible responses to foreign land investment.

The potential success of legislative reform depends upon its
response to the concerns that implicate the need to change the present

system. First, any change in current regulation must remain flexible
enough to adequately provide for the needs of particular communities.
At the same time, there must be uniformity of treatment among the
states to avoid phantom disincentives. Moreover, a new statutory
scheme must prevent the easy circumvention that many current laws
permit.
investment. See H.R. REP. No. 1570, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2914, 2916-17. See also Note, supra note 27, at 32.
107. Communities may find a benefit from foreign investment in light of three local
factors which outweigh the negative forces of xenophobia. For example, the town of Pittston, Pa., was threatened with economic collapse several years ago when the area's coal
mines closed. In 1969, however, Schott Optical Glass Co., a West German firm, opened a
manufacturing plant in the town. In 1969, the plant had sixty employees. In 1978, it had
six hundred. The city has not only survived the coal failure, but has prospered from foreign
investment. City officials have hired a Swiss investment consultant to recruit other foreign
companies, and in mid-1978 expected the opening of a Swiss machine company's local
plant. The city also created a forty-two acre industrial park designated as an international
trade zone, lengthened the local airport runway to accommodate jumbo jets, and worked to
make the community more attractive to foreign investors. The Selling ofAmerica: Foreign
CapitalRushes Into U.S., CreatingJobs andSome Controversy, TIME, May 29, 1978, at 70,
73. Any previous fears of foreign takeovers or damaging influence have long been overshadowed by the prosperity which foreign investments have brought the town.
108. The result, however, would not be total homogeneity. Rather, each state would be
given the opportunity to adopt the uniform act, use its own law, or amend the uniform law
to meet local needs. The possibility of conflict among state laws remains to the same
extent. Nonetheless, a well-designed uniform statute could provide for most state concerns
and prevent most state dissent. The optimal situation would leave a black-and-white system of states who have either adopted the uniform laws or have no restriction on alien land
investment.
109. See supra notes 79-103 and accompanying text.
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IV. A MODEL FOR A UNIFORM FOREIGN LAND
INVESTMENT LAW
An effective statutory policy for foreign investment in U.S. real
estate must recognize that foreign investment may be harmful in some
areas but beneficial in others. Existing state and federal alien land
laws have not done this; instead, they have chosen to implement either
an encouragement or a discouragement policy, but not both. This

Note, therefore, proposes a model uniform law that would distinguish
between areas in which foreign investment should be discouraged and
areas where it should be encouraged and that would provide a strong
framework that will prevent the possibility of circumvention.
A.

DESIGNATION OF ZONES

The first function of the uniform law would be to provide for the
designation of geographic areas as either encouragement or discouragement zones. The task of designation would be delegated to groups
of real estate investment experts, legal scholars, and international

investment authorities assembled in panels or commissions for the

purpose of determining the investment needs of specific regions.1 10
The result of this geographic designation would be two types of
geographic zones, each with a distinct set of applicable policies. The
discouragement zone would include all areas to which foreign invest-

ment activity poses a sufficiently significant threat to warrant regulation. The other zone would include areas in which foreign investment
would be beneficial to local and regional interests.
In order to efficiently apply such a binary law, all potential areas

must be designated as either encouragement or discouragement zones.
110. An illustrative comparison exists in the designation proceedings under the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). NHPA, the preeminent federal law for protecting and
preserving historically significant sites, establishes a detailed procedure for identification
and protection of historic sites. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1982). The Act provides for listing of
significant historic sites, buildings and landmarks in the National Register of Historic
Places, administered by the Secretary of the Interior. 16 U.S.C. § 470a (1982). One of the
four methods of including a property in the National Register is nomination by the state
historic preservation officer ("SHPO"), local governments, or individuals. Id. § 470a (a-d)
(1982). Under this procedure, a state review board nominates properties to determine
whether they meet the criteria for evaluation, and recommends that the state historic preservation officer approve nomination. These state, and sometimes local boards, are a helpful
model for the type of commissions necessary for the evaluation of foreign land investment
zones. Under the regulations in NHPA, the board designated by the SHPO must include
persons who are professionals in the fields of history, archaeology, architectural history,
and architecture. These experts are skilled in recognizing the necessary facts that make up
the criteria for designation and also have knowledge of the local factors relevant to particular properties. See generally A HANDBOOK ON HIsTORIC PRESERVATION LAW 197-207
(C. Duerksen ed. 1983).
This application of expertise and local interest to designation commissions would be beneficial to the procedural operation of a uniform law of foreign real estate investment.
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Thus, there would be some difficulty in areas where the potential
harms and benefits of foreign real estate investment are not clear.
Nonetheless, all areas should be designated, and marginal areas should
be made discouragement areas for procedural purposes and assigned
the most lenient degrees of regulatory scrutiny.I1 I In this regard, the

designation as a discouragement area would create a procedural presumption against investment, because the immediate dangers of investment outweigh the potential benefits of benign investment.

B. FORMATION OF POLICY BY ZONE
Once an area has been designated, the uniform law would dictate
the procedures for foreign investment activity within each zone. The
provisions of the uniform law would establish guidelines and requirements for foreign investment in real estate located in discouragement
zones and would outline strategies for attracting investment capital to
encouragement zones. A uniform foreign land investment law could
not by itself impose jurisdictional restrictions or incentive programs
upon local communities. Instead, each state must adopt the law, but
the uniform statute would provide state authorities with significant
direction and would ensure uniformity of treatment of foreign inves11 2
tors throughout the United States.
The uniform law is not limited to two investment area distinc-.
tions. Ideally, the law could develop a series of designations within
each zone. For example, within a discouragement zone, a specific area
may be extremely sensitive to foreign investment due to particular geographic or socio-economic factors. 113 In this type of area, the state
could require investors to make frequent disclosure statements, to
maintain local representatives or agents, and even to participate in
community awareness and preservation programs. In less precarious
areas, moderate provisions, such as disclosure requirements like those
of AFIDA, would apply. By using variable designations dependent
Il1. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
112. This model for a uniform foreign real estate investment law necessarily operates on
the assumption that all, or substantially all, of the states adopt the enactment. Realisti-

cally, however, the result would not be total homogeneity. Each state would be given the
opportunity to adopt the uniform act as proposed, to adopt a version amended to meet
local needs, or to use its own law. Thus, conflict among state laws remains a possibility.
Nonetheless, a well-designed uniform statute could provide for most state concerns and
prevent most state dissent. Then the optimal situation would result in a black-and-white
system of states who have either adopted the uniform laws or have no restriction on alien
land investment.
113. Extreme sensitivity to foreign investment may occur in an area with a severely
limited resource, such as agricultural land or low-income rental housing, or in an area
experiencing severe economic depression.
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upon the particular socio-geographic 1 4 characteristics of an area, the
statute would remain cognizant of the local characteristics of investment areas. Moreover, the law would retain flexibility through the use
of variable designations within each discouragement zone.
Encouragement zones designated under the uniform law could be
treated with the same flexibility and local emphasis as the discouragement zones. A strong encouragement designation could include provisions for tax incentives, inducement programs, and infrastructure
attractions for foreign investors.1 15 A more moderate encouragement
designation might entail programs to provide foreign investors with
information about investment opportunities in specific geographic
areas that have been determined to be suitable for investment. The
most passive encouragement designation would adopt a wholly laissezfaire attitude under which no statement of encouragement or restriction would be made.
It is important for the uniform law to include provisions for state
or local bodies to make special designations under the authority of the
state governments adopting the act. These designations would be
analogous to the special permit system in a typical comprehensive zoning plan.' 16 In such a system, a particular land use is allowed despite
its nonconformity to other land uses in the area if specific requirements are met. Legal bodies could grant special conditional permits
for specific foreign investment activities, conditioned upon specific
requirements, such as contributions to economic or community needs,
in otherwise restricted zones.
The uniform system would be designed for flexibility. Some
areas, such as extremely delicate agricultural lands, could be wholly
removed from foreign investment, provided such exclusion is constitutional. 117 Special permits and exceptions, however, could be kept to a
minimum under this flexible system. The emphasis would not be on
wholly outlawing or wholly promoting investment but on developing a
114. The term geography, as used here, connotes a far broader meaning than is given in
most grade school educations. Geography involves the study of not only the physical
make-up of the earth's surface, but also includes the study of the living species, particularly
man, which inhabit the earth, and the ways in which all species and physical structures
interact. Geography is therefore a broad science, encompassing geology, physics, biology
and botany, as well as sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, and history.
See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 948 (unabridged ed. 1976).
115. See supra note 107. Admittedly, most of these incentive programs must be promulgated by local governments such as Pittston, Pennsylvania, and will not become more available by virtue of inclusion in a uniform act. However, while the act cannot force a town to
build a larger airport, it does offer foreign investors a centralized source in which to find
examples of the types of incentives they may anticipate when making investment location
decisions.
116. See A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING, at § 12.0611] (1980).
117. See infra notes 118-32 and accompanying text.
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flexible policy of mixed encouragement and discouragement. This policy would be rationally related to the peculiar geographic realities of a
given region, and it would be uniform in its general treatment of for-

eign real estate investors throughout the United States.
C.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A UNIFORM FOREIGN LAND
INVESTMENT LAW

The proposed uniform law would be permissible under the Constitution of the United States." 8 A constitutional challenge to alien
land regulation would probably arise only in the context of disincentives to foreign ownership of U.S. land. Such restrictive regulation
would be subject to constitutional attack on equal protection 1 9
grounds, or as violations of the foreign relations 120 and foreign commerce powers12 1 of the federal government.
The Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of
domestic regulation of alien land ownership under the equal protection clause,1 22 and the appropriate level of equal protection scrutiny 123
118. For a discussion of the constitutional ramifications of alien land investment regulation that is beyond the scope of this Note, see Huizinga, Alien Land Laws: Constitutional
Limitations on State Power to Regulate, 32 HAST. L.J. 251 (1980-81); Morrison, supra note
48; Note, State Laws RestrictingLand Purchasesby Aliens: Some Constitutionaland Policy
Considerations,21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135 (1982).

119. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
120. Id art. 1, § 10.
121. Id § 81.
122. But see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); affg Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp. 250
(E.D. Pa. 1970) (all three treating alienage as a suspect classification in other situations).
In Graham, the United States Supreme Court invalidated two state statutes that denied
welfare benefits to resident aliens and aliens who had not resided in the United States for a
specified number of years. See 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 432(2) (Purdon 1968)
(amended version at 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 432 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85)); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-233 (1956) (amended version at ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46-233
(Supp. 1984-85)). Justice Blackmun's opinion invoked strict judicial scrutiny. 403 U.S. at
371-72.
The equal protection concept applies to "persons" as opposed to "citizens." Id. Cf. U.S.
CONST. amend. XV, § 1, (preserving the right to vote to all citizens of the United States)
(emphasis supplied). As such, aliens are entitled to these constitutional protections. Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). See Zaritsky, Foreign Ownership of Property in
the US.: Federaland State Restrictions, reprintedin Committee Print, supra note 25, at
191. The basic inquiry of equal protection analysis addresses the relationship between the
purpose of a statute and the classification it makes. For a general discussion of legislative
classifications and their role in equal protection analysis, see J.E. NOWAK, R.D. ROTUNDA,
& J.N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 585-599 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as

NowAK].
123. A regulation of foreign land ownership must have some level of relatedness
between its statutory purpose and the differential treatment of foreign investors. See Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (equal protection applies to alien classifications).
See also Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915). Equal protection analysis applies different
types of scrutiny to these classifications, requiring different levels of relatedness. A law
involving a "suspect classification" or a "fundamental right," see U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1958), invokes strict judicial scrutiny, see NOWAK, supra note
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is unsettled. If strict judicial scrutiny were applied, as it arguably
would be by analogy to other resident alien cases, 124 the regulation of

ownership of U.S. land by resident aliens would have to be necessary
to achieving a compelling governmental interest. If the more lenient,
rational relationship standard were applied, as it most likely would be
in the case of regulation of nonresident alien land holdings, then the
regulation would only need to bear a rational relationship to its
intended purpose. 125 Most laws are directed at nonresident aliens, to
whom the rational relationship standard is most fitting.
A uniform foreign land investment law adopted by the various

states would pass equal protection evaluation if the law were to apply
to nonresident investors, because classification by residency will
receive the more lenient scrutiny. In other words, regulation of nonresident investors will be upheld more easily because resident aliens
are treated as citizens. Where regulations affect residents and nonresidents alike, however, resident investors would be protected by strict
122, at 524. Strict scrutiny requires the government to show that a classification is justified
by a compelling state interest. Id. Alienage is a suspect classification. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. at 372.
124. However, Justice Blackmun emphasized in Graham the permanency of aliens' residence in the United States. His Graham opinion quoted the district court in the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania: "aliens like citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed
forces. Unlike the short-term residents in Shapiro, aliens may live within a state for many
years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of the state." 403 U.S. at
376, quoting 321 F. Supp. at 253. (In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1968), the
Supreme Court held that economic interests were an insufficient foundation to justify denial
of welfare benefits to persons who resided within a state for less than one year).
At least one commentator has relied upon this emphasis to conclude that Graham'srule
applies only to resident aliens. Morrison, supra note 48, at 642-43. A nonresident alien
investor in land may therefore face a lower constitutional standard than a resident alien.
This distinction is significant, because many of the feared dangers of foreign real estate
investment may be unique to investment by nonresident aliens. Absenteeism, and the
problems which arise out of an international landlord-tenant relationship, is one example.
See supra note 106. Similarly, the fears that foreign real estate investors will bring about
neighborhood change as a result of injecting their native experiences and preferences into
the American market seem diluted with respect to resident aliens. Id As such, restrictions
against detrimental foreign investment by nonresident aliens may pass equal protection
analysis under the more lenient rational-relationship standard. See NOWAK, supra note
122, at 682-86.
Morrison cites those states which have given full or partial exceptions from their laws to
resident aliens: Connecticut, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
Wisconsin and Wyoming. Morrison, supra note 48, at 642 n.144. See CoNN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 47-57 (West 1978); IowA CoNsT. art. 1, § 22; IOWA CODE § 567.1 (1977); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 381.320 (Baldwin 1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-23 (1972); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:20 (1983); OKLA. CONST. art. XXII, § 1; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
60, § 121, (West 1971); Wis. CONST. art. I, § 15; Wyo. CONST. art. I, § 29. A state, therefore, might be able to regulate nonresident aliens under a lower level of constitutional scrutiny. Morrison, supra note 48, at 642-43.
125. Under rational relationship scrutiny, the state need only prove that the classification, excluding aliens, is rationally related to the purpose of the statute-i.e., the elimination of foreign influence.
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scrutiny analysis, and the law would then have to further a compelling
state interest.
Due process scrutiny would uphold a foreign land investment law
if a legitimate purpose, such as protecting local investment interests,
were articulated and if compensation were paid where necessary.
Xenophobic fears or popular emotions, however, will not support a
126
law through constitutional scrutiny.
Alien land regulations must also withstand scrutiny under the
foreign relations and foreign commerce powers of the federal government. These powers may be grouped together into one notion of the
supremacy of the federal government. Land laws have traditionally
been regarded as a purely local concern.1 27 The authority for these
laws is the state's police power and historical notions of state territorial autonomy. Yet, because these laws affect foreigners, they may
also affect foreign relations. The federal government has exclusive
power over foreign relations; a state cannot conduct its own foreign
poicy.128 Like equal protection guarantees, the foreign relations
power does not invalidate allforms of alien land restriction. There is a
continuum along which degrees of local interest are weighed against
the amount of foreign relations activity that a state undertakes.
The most blatant state interferences with U.S. foreign policy
would be in jeopardy.1 29 Nonetheless, although exclusivity of federal
foreign policy power is constitutionally guaranteed, the degree to
which this power constrains state power to regulate land ownership is
subject to judicial interpretation.1 30 Foreign investment laws could
126. Due process considerations are really of lesser concern: "The due process clause is
not an effective limitation on state legislation, but it does compel a clear articulation of the
purpose of the laws, and this makes a proper constitutional examination of them under the
applicable tests." Morrison, supra note 48, at 645. Basically, regulation of alien land holdings must serve a clearly articulated legislative purpose. A court's willingness to strike
down a statute for lack of such a purpose is unlikely, however, given the presently discredited notion of substantive due process, upon which such judicial action would rest. A more
relevant due process consideration is that any regulation of domestic lands already held by
aliens must not constitute an unjust taking; fair compensation for the loss of property rights
already held by aliens must be paid by regulating state governments. U.S. CONST., art. I,

§ 10.
127. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217-18 (1923); Blythe v. Hinckley, 180
U.S. 333, 341-42 (1901).
128. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-1 (1968). "The several States, of course,
have traditionally regulated the descent and distribution of estates. But those regulations
must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy." Id. at
440.
129. Morrison, in fact, points to two statutes that designate specific land holding
requirements for residents of certain countries as "smack[ing] too much of independent
foreign policy." Morrison, supra note 48, at 649. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-57
(1960) (France); Mss. CODE ANN. § 898-1-23 (1972) (Syria, Lebanon).
130. In Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), the Supreme Court held that a state may
condition an alien's right to inherit property upon reciprocal provisions of the alien's home
government toward U.S. citizens. The Court concluded that these state laws did not exces-
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conceivably survive foreign relations scrutiny, provided they address
13 1
land use concerns and do not affect federal policy too drastically.
Thus, the regulation of land investment activity, undertaken under the
police powers of states, could arguably exist without treading upon
1 32
federal ground.
An effective law should avoid outright prohibition of foreign
investment, which would likely interfere with foreign relations. The

uniform law must not single out foreign countries for special treatment
nor specifically address individual industries. If the enactment is legitimately aimed at protecting local interests, it will not violate provi-

sions of federal supremacy. Moreover, the proposed act would have to
articulate rationally the purposes of preventing harms from foreign
land investment and encouraging beneficial investment. The provisions would also have to enunciate clearly the relationship between the
provisions and these goals.1 33
CONCLUSION
The present system of regulating foreign investment in U.S. real
estate is ineffective and can operate as an unnecessary disincentive to
sively interfere with the foreign relations power, and that states could condition or limit
property rights. Id. at 517. The Court modified this position thirty years later in Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968). There the Court invalidated an Oregon statute which conditioned inheritance rights on reciprocal rights of U.S. citizens to repatriate the proceeds of
inheritance abroad. Id, at 441. Although the Oregon statute in Zschernig was quite similar on its face to that in Clark, the Court found a basis for distinction in the way Oregon
courts had applied the law. OR. Rnv. STAT. §§ 11 1.070(l)(a), (b) (1957), (repealedby 1969
Or. Laws 591, § 305), quoted in Zschernig 389 U.S. at 430 n.1 (1968). The Court voided
the statute as construed, because it seemed to give preferential treatment to certain types of
governments.
In short, it would seem that Oregon judges in construing § 11.1070 seek to ascertain whether "rights" protected by foreign law are the same "rights" that citizens
of Oregon enjoy. If, as in the Rogers case [219 Or. 233, 347 P.2d 57 (1959)], the
alleged foreign "right" may be vindicated only through Communist-controlled
state agencies, then there is no "right" of the type § 111.070 requires. . . . The
statute as construed seems to make unavoidable judicial criticism of nations established on a more authoritarian basis than our own.
It seems inescapable that the type of probate law that Oregon enforces affects international relations in a persistent and subtle way.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 440. Preferential treatment is therefore one indication that a state
law has moved away from the states' local power and entered the zone of foreign relations
power. See also Morrison, supra note 48, at 647-48, arguing that Zschernig may be limited
to its own facts because it stopped short of overruling Clark.
131. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 484 (1880).
132. But see Morrison, supra note 48, at 649-50.
An alien land regulation promulgated by a state government must also withstand scrutiny under the commerce power of the federal government.
133. See generally Note, Closing the Barn Door: A Suggested United States Response to
InternationalRestrictions on Foreign Acquisition of Agricultural Land, 10 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 536-63 (1980) for a more expansive discussion of this topic than is possible within the
scope of this Note.
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investment activity that in many situations could be beneficial. Legislative regulation of foreign land investment is necessary, but it must be
uniform throughout the United States and must remain cognizant of
the needs of individual communities. A conscientious uniform law
could designate areas for discouragement or encouragement of foreign
land investment and apply uniform, rational regulations to direct foreign investment activities in a profitable and beneficial way. This legislative innovation would be constitutionally permissible, despite equal
protection or foreign relations power challenges. As global economies
continue to make U.S. investments attractive and land investments
particularly popular, the need for uniformity will intensify. The proposed uniform law would improve upon the current treatment of
investors and misapplied methods of regulation, which deflect beneficial investment and fail to restrict harmful investment.
Andrew J. Starrels

